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Abstract
If one formulates Helmholtz’s ideas about perception in terms of modern-day theories one arrives at
a model of perceptual inference and learning that can explain a remarkable range of neurobiological
facts. Using constructs from statistical physics it can be shown that the problems of inferring what
cause our sensory input and learning causal regularities in the sensorium can be resolved using exactly
the same principles. Furthermore, inference and learning can proceed in a biologically plausible
fashion. The ensuing scheme rests on Empirical Bayes and hierarchical models of how sensory
information is generated. The use of hierarchical models enables the brain to construct prior
expectations in a dynamic and context-sensitive fashion. This scheme provides a principled way to
understand many aspects of the brain’s organisation and responses.
In this paper, we suggest that these perceptual processes are just one emergent property of systems
that conform to a free-energy principle. The free-energy considered here represents a bound on the
surprise inherent in any exchange with the environment, under expectations encoded by its state or
configuration. A system can minimise free-energy by changing its configuration to change the way
it samples the environment, or to change its expectations. These changes correspond to action and
perception respectively and lead to an adaptive exchange with the environment that is characteristic
of biological systems. This treatment implies that the system’s state and structure encode an implicit
and probabilistic model of the environment. We will look at models entailed by the brain and how
minimisation of free-energy can explain its dynamics and structure.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper illustrates how ideas from theoretical physics can help understand the structure and
dynamics of biological systems, in particular the brain. This is not a rigorous treatment, but a
series of heuristics that provide an interesting perspective on how biological systems might
function. The first section motivates and describes a free-energy principle that addresses the
maintenance of structural order seen in living systems. The subsequent sections use this
principle to understand key functional and structural aspects of neuronal systems, with a focus
on perceptual learning and inference. This work pursues an agenda established by von
Helmholtz in the nineteenth century, who sought a basis for neuronal energy in his work on
conservation laws in physics. This ambition underlies many energy-based approaches to neural
networks (Borisyuk and Hoppensteadt 2004), including the approach described here.
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Despite the latitude for disorder, the nervous system maintains an exquisite configurational
and dynamic order. This order is preserved on both an evolutionary and somatic time-scale.
The amount of reproducible anatomic information pertaining to the brain is now so vast it can
only be organised electronically (e.g., Stephan et al 2001). Furthermore, the brain’s
spatiotemporal responses, elicited experimentally, are sufficiently reproducible that they
support whole fields of neuroscience (e.g., human brain mapping). The premise of this paper
is that this precise structural and functional organisation is maintained by causal structure in
the environment. The principles behind this maintenance and the attending neuronal
mechanisms are the subject of this paper.
The analysis presented in this paper rests on some fairly mathematical and abstract approaches
to understanding the behaviour of systems. These approaches were developed primarily in
statistical physics and machine learning. The payoff for adopting this mathematical treatment
is that many apparently diverse aspects of the brain’s structure and function can be understood
in terms of one simple principle; namely the minimisation of a quantity (free-energy) that
reflects the probability of sensory input, given the current state of the brain. We will see that
this principle can be applied at different time-scales to explain perpetual inference, attention
and learning. Furthermore, exactly the same principle can explain how we interact with, or
sample, the environment; providing a principled account of adaptive behaviour. It highlights
the importance of perception for action and enforces a mechanistic view of many ethological
and neuronal processes. Another payoff is the disclosure of some rather counterintuitive
conclusions about our brains; for example, it suggests that everything we do serves to minimise
surprising exchanges with the environment (and other people); it suggests that perception plays
a secondary role in optimising action; it suggests that the salience, attention and the encoding
of uncertainty in the brain are all aspects of the same underlying process; it suggests the
hierarchal structure of our brains is transcribed from causal hierarchies in the environment.
Finally, it furnishes clear links among other important formulations of adaptive systems; for
example, we will see that value, in microeconomics and reinforcement learning, is synonymous
with (negative) free-energy and surprise. Similarly, adaptive fitness can be formulated in terms
of free-energy, which allows one to link evolutionary and somatic timescales in terms of
hierarchical co-evolution.
Many people now regard the brain as an inference machine that conforms to the same principles
that govern the interrogation of scientific data (MacKay, 1956; Neisser, 1967; Ballard et al,
1983; Mumford, 1992; Kawato et al 1993; Rao and Ballard 1998; Dayan et al, 1995; Friston,
2003; Körding and Wolpert 2004; Kersten et al 2004; Friston 2005). In everyday life, these
rules are applied to information obtained by sampling the world with our senses. Over the past
years, we have pursued this perspective in a Bayesian framework to suggest that the brain
employs hierarchical or empirical Bayes to infer the causes of its sensations. This model of
brain function can explain a wide range of anatomical and physiological facts; for example,
the hierarchical deployment of cortical areas, recurrent architectures using forward and
backward connections and functional asymmetries in these connections (Angelucci et al,
2002a; Friston 2003). In terms of synaptic physiology, it predicts associative plasticity and,
for dynamic models, spike-timing-dependent plasticity. In terms of electrophysiology it
accounts for classical and extra-classical receptive field effects and long-latency or endogenous
components of evoked cortical responses (Rao and Ballard, 1998; Friston 2005). It predicts
the attenuation of responses encoding prediction error, with perceptual learning, and explains
many phenomena like repetition suppression, mismatch negativity and the P300 in
electroencephalography. In psychophysical terms, it accounts for the behavioural correlates of
these physiological phenomena, e.g., priming, and global precedence (see Friston 2005 for an
overview)
Friston and Stephan Page 2
Synthese. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 March 25.
U
KPM
C
 Funders G
roup Author M
anuscript
U
KPM
C
 Funders G
roup Author M
anuscript
It is fairly easy to show that both perceptual inference and learning rest on a minimisation of
free-energy (Friston 2003) or suppression of prediction error (Rao and Ballard 1998). The
notion of free-energy derives from statistical physics and is used widely in machine learning
to convert difficult integration problems, inherent in inference, into easier optimisation
problems. This optimisation or free-energy minimisation can, in principle, be implemented
using relatively simple neuronal infrastructures. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that
perception is just one emergent aspect of free-energy minimisation and that a free-energy
principle for the brain can explain the intimate relationship between perception and action.
Furthermore, the processes entailed by the free-energy principle cover not just inference about
the current state of the world but a dynamic encoding of context that bears the hallmarks of
attention and perceptual salience.
The free-energy principle states that systems change to decrease their free-energy. The concept
of free-energy arises in many contexts, especially physics and statistics. In thermodynamics,
free-energy is a measure of the amount of work that can be extracted from a system, and is
useful in engineering applications (see Streater 1993 for discussion of free-energy theorems).
It is the difference between the energy and the entropy of a system. Free-energy also plays a
central role in statistics, where, borrowing from statistical thermodynamics, approximate
inference by variational free-energy minimization (also known as variational Bayes, or
ensemble learning) has maximum likelihood and maximum a posteriori methods as special
cases. It should be noted that the only link between these two uses of the term ‘free-energy’ is
mathematical; i.e., both appeal to the same probabilistic fundaments. It is the second sort of
free-energy, which is a measure of statistical probability distributions that we apply to the
exchange of biological systems with the world. The implication is that these systems make
implicit inferences about their surroundings. Previous treatments of free-energy in inference
(e.g., predictive coding) have been framed as explanations or descriptions of the brain at work.
In this paper, we try to go a step further by suggesting that free-energy minimisation is
mandatory in biological systems and has a more fundamental status. We try to do this by
presenting a series of heuristics that draw from theoretical biology and statistical
thermodynamics.
Overview
This paper has three sections. In the first, we lay out the theory behind the free-energy principle,
starting from a selectionist standpoint and ending with the implications of the free-energy
principle for neurobiology. The second section addresses the implementation of free-energy
minimisation in hierarchical neuronal architectures and concludes with a simple simulation of
sensory evoked responses. This illustrates some of the key behaviours of brain-like systems
that self-organise in accord with the free-energy principle. A key phenomenon; namely,
suppression of prediction error by top-down predictions from higher cortical areas, is examined
in the third section. In this final section, we review some key issues in neurobiology that can
be understood under the free energy principle.
THEORY
In this section, we develop a series of heuristics that lead to a variational free-energy principle
for biological systems and, in particular, the brain. We start with evolutionary or selectionist
considerations that transform difficult questions about how biological systems operate into
simpler questions about constraints on their behaviour. These constraints lead to the important
notion of an ensemble density that is encoded by the state of the system. This density is used
to construct a free-energy for any system that is in exchange with its environment. We then
consider the implications of minimising this free-energy with regard to quantities that
determine the system’s (i.e., brain’s) state and, critically, its action upon the environment. We
will see that this minimisation leads naturally to perceptual inference about the world, encoding
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of perceptual uncertainty (i.e., attention or salience), perceptual learning about the causal
structure of the environment and, finally, a principled exchange with, or sampling of, that
environment.
In what follows, free-energy becomes a Lyapunov function for the brain. A Lyapunov function
is a scalar function of a system’s state that decreases with time; it is also referred to colloquially
as a Harmony function in the neural network literature (Prince and Smolensky, 1997). There
are many examples of related energy functionals1 in the time-dependent partial differential
equations literature (e.g., Kloucek, 1998). Usually, one tries to infer the Lyapunov function
given a system’s structure and behaviour. However, we address the converse problem: given
the Lyapunov function, what would systems that minimise free-energy look like?
Thermodynamics and biological systems
We start with an apparent anomaly: biological systems and especially neuronal systems appear
to contravene the second law of thermodynamics. The second law states that the entropy of
closed systems increases with time. Entropy is a measure of disorder or, more simply, the
number of ways the elements of a system can be rearranged. In the physical sciences the second
law of thermodynamics is fundamental and has attained almost cult status: As noted by Sir
Arthur Eddington “If someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in
disagreement with Maxwell’s equations, then so much the worse for Maxwell’s equations. And
if your theory contradicts the facts, well, sometimes these experimentalists make mistakes. But
if your theory is found to be against the Second Law of Thermodynamics, I can give you no
hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest
humiliation” (http://en.wikipedia.org/Second_law). The fact that the second law applies only
to ‘closed’ systems is quite important because biological systems are open, which means they
have the opportunity to resist the second law; but how?
Thermodynamics and fluctuations—The second law applies to macroscopic or ensemble
behaviour. It posits time-irreversible behaviour of a system, despite the fact that its microscopic
dynamics can be time-reversible. This apparent paradox is resolved with the Fluctuation
Theorem (see Evans & Searles 2002). The Fluctuation Theorem shows that the entropy of small
systems can decrease but as the system’s size or the observation time gets longer, the probability
of this happening decreases exponentially. The fluctuation theorem is important for non-
equilibrium statistical mechanics, and includes the second law as a special case. Critically, the
Fluctuation Theorem holds for dissipative, non-equilibrium systems. A dissipative system is
an open system, which operates far-from-equilibrium by exchanging energy or entropy with
the environment. Recently, the Fluctuation Theorem has been applied to non-equilibrium
transitions between equilibrium states to show how free-energy differences can be computed
from thermodynamic path integrals (Crooks 1999). Equivalent derivations for deterministic
systems highlight the close relationship between non-equilibrium free-energy theorems and
the Fluctuation Theorem (Evans 2003). These non-equilibrium free-energy theorems are of
particular interest because they apply to dissipative systems like biological systems.
The nature of biological systems
If the Fluctuation Theorem is so fundamental, why do we see order emerging all around us?
Specifically, why are living systems apparently exempt from these thermodynamic laws? How
do they preserve their order (i.e., configurational entropy)2, immersed in an environment that
is becoming irrevocably more disordered? The premise here is that the environment unfolds
1A functional is a function of a function.
2Configurational entropy measures randomness in the distribution of matter in the same way that thermal entropy measures the distribution
of energy.
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in a thermodynamically structured and lawful way and biological systems embed these laws
into their anatomy. The existence of environmental order is assured, at the level of probability
distributions, through thermodynamics. For example, although disorder always increases, the
second law per se is invariant. This invariance is itself a source of order. In short, organisms
could maintain configurational order, if they transcribed physical laws governing their
environment into their structure. One might ask how this transcription occurs. However, a more
basic question is not how biological systems arise, but what are they?
What is the difference between a plant and a stone? The obvious answer is that the plant is an
open non-equilibrium system, exchanging matter and energy with the environment, whereas
the stone is an open system that is largely at equilibrium: Morowitz computed the thermal
bonding energy required to assemble a single Escherichia coli bacterium. He concluded “if
equilibrium process alone were at work, the largest possible fluctuation in the history of the
universe is likely to have been no longer than a small peptide” (Morowitz 1968; p68). In short,
biological systems must operate far-from-equilibrium: The flow of matter and energy in open
systems allows them to exchange entropy with the environment and self-organise. Self-
organisation (Ashby 1947, Haken 1983) refers to the spontaneous increase in the internal
organisation of open systems. Typically, self-organising systems also exhibit emergent
properties. Self-organisation only occurs when the system is far-from-equilibrium (Nicolis and
Prigogine 1977). The concept of self-organisation is central to the description of biological
systems and also plays a key role in chemistry, where is it often taken to be synonymous with
self-assembly3.
Beyond self-organisation—Biological systems are thermodynamically open, in the sense
that they exchange energy and entropy with the environment. Furthermore, they operate far-
from-equilibrium, showing self-organising behaviour (Ashby, 1947; Nicolis and Prigogine,
1977; Haken 1983; Kauffman 1993). However, biological systems are more than simply
dissipative self-organising systems. They can negotiate a changing or non-stationary
environment in a way that allows them to endure over substantial periods of time. This means
that they avoid phase-transitions that would otherwise change their physical structure. A key
aspect of biological systems is that they act upon the environment to change their position
within it, or relation to it, in a way that precludes extremes of temperature, pressure or other
external fields. By sampling or navigating the environment selectively, they keep their
exchange within bounds and preserve their physical integrity. A fanciful example is provided
in Figure 1: Here, we have taken a paradigm example of a non-biological self-organising
system, namely a snowflake and endowed it with wings so that it can act on the environment.
A normal snowflake will fall and encounter a phase-boundary, at which its temperature will
cause it to melt. Conversely, snowflakes that maintain their altitude and regulate their
temperature may survive indefinitely, with a qualitatively recognisable form. The key
difference between the normal and adaptive snowflake is the ability to change their relationship
with the environment and maintain thermodynamic homeostasis. Similar mechanisms can be
envisaged in an evolutionary setting, wherein systems that avoid phase-transitions will be
selected above those that cannot (c.f., the selection of chemotaxis in single-cell organisms). By
considering the nature of biological systems in terms of selective pressure, one can replace
difficult questions about how biological systems emerge with questions about what behaviours
they must exhibit to exist. In other words, selection explains how biological systems arise; the
only outstanding issue is what characteristics they must possess. The snowflake example
3The theory of dissipative structures was developed to understand structure formation in far-from-equilibrium systems. Examples include
turbulence and convection in fluid dynamics (e.g., Bénard cells), percolation and reaction-diffusion systems such as the Belousov-
Zhabotinsky reaction. Self-assembly is another important example from chemistry that has biological implications (e.g. for pre-biotic
formation of proteins). Self-organization depends on a (reasonably) stationary environment that couples to the system to allow an
appropriate exchange of entropy and energy.
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suggests biological systems act upon the environment to preclude phase-transitions. It is
therefore sufficient to define a principle that ensures this sort of exchange. We will see that
free-energy minimisation is one such principle.
A free-energy formulation
To develop these arguments formally, we need to define some quantities that describe an agent,
phenotype or system, m and its exchange with the environment. This exchange rests on
quantities that describe the system, the effect of the environment on the system and the effect
of the system on the environment. We will denote these as λ,  and α respectively.  can be
thought of as system states that are caused by environmental forces; for example, the state of
sensory receptors. This means that  can be regarded as sensory input. The quantities α represent
forces exerted by effectors that act on the environment to change sensory samples. We will
represent this dependency by conditioning the sensory samples  on action.
Sometimes, this dependency can be quite simple: for example, the activity of stretch receptors
in muscle spindles is affected directly by muscular forces causing that spindle to contract. In
other cases, the dependency can be more complicated; for example, the oculomotor system,
controlling eye position, can influence the activity of every photoreceptor in the retina.
The tilde means that  covers generalised motion in terms of high-order
temporal derivatives. This allows α to change the motion or trajectory of sensory input through
its higher derivatives by interacting with forces that cause . We will call these environmental
causes ϑ7. This formulation means that sensory input is a generalised convolution of the action
and unknown or hidden causes. We will unpack these quantities later. At the moment, we will
simply note that they can be high-dimensional and time-varying. See also Figure 2.
A free-energy bound—The basic premise we start with is that biological systems must keep
 within bounds (i.e., phase-boundaries) through adaptive changes in α. Put simply, adaptive
systems or agents should minimise unlikely or surprising exchanges with the environment. We
can express this more formally by requiring adaptive systems to minimise surprise, or maximise
the following quantity
1
In fact, it is fairly simple to show that any member of a population, whose population density,
 is at equilibrium, must, on average increase  (Friston et al in preparation).
The conditional surprise  measures the improbability of exchange given a
particular agent and its action. Each point in the space of exchange  will have a
measure of this sort, which will be high if the exchange is compatible with m and low if not
(i.e., high in domains populated by m ). More intuitively, we would be surprised, given a
particular system, to find it in some environments (e.g., a snowflake in a sauna). In a selectionist
setting, the quantity  could be regarded as the adaptive value of a particular exchange.
From a statistical perspective,  is also known as the log-evidence or marginal likelihood
(marginal because it obtains by integrating out dependencies on the causes, ϑ7). These two
perspectives are useful because they link selection in theoretical biology to Bayesian model
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selection in machine learning; we will exploit this link below by treating the system or agent
as a model of its sensory input. Finally,  also plays the role of the value in
microeconomics and value-learning. Value-learning is a branch of computational neuroscience
that deals with the reinforcement of actions and optimisation of policies. In short, for a given
agent we require action to optimise4
2
where  is the joint density of environmental effects and their unknown causes,
conditioned an action. However, this maximisation must be accomplished by changes in action,
which can only be a function of  and the internal states, λ of the agent; because these are the
only variables it has access to.
Clearly, the system cannot perform the integration in Eq.2 because it does not know the causes.
However, it can optimise a bound on the integral using a relatively simple gradient descent.
One such bound is the free-energy, which is a scalar function of sensory and internal states5
3
The inequality is an example of something called Jensen’s inequality, which follows simply
from the concavity of the log function. To make this bound,  a function of internal
states λ , we have introduced q(ϑ;λ), which is an arbitrary density function on the causes that
is encoded by the system’s internal states. Usually, q(ϑ;λ) is called an ensemble density6 and
can be regarded as the probability density that the causes ϑ7 would be selected from an
ensemble of environments. For example, λ could be the mean and variance of a Gaussian
distribution on temperature, ϑ7.
The free-energy (i.e., the bound) above comprises two terms. The first is the energy expected
under the ensemble density. This energy is simply the surprise or information about the joint
occurrence of the sensory input and its causes. The second term is the negative entropy of the
ensemble density. Notice that action can be considered causes of sensory input that are not
covered by the ensemble density. In what follows, we look at the ensemble density and its role
in adaptive behaviour.
The ensemble and generative densities—The free-energy formulation in Eq.3 has a
fundamental implication: systems that minimise the surprise of their interactions with the
environment by adaptive sampling can only do so by optimising a bound, which is a function
of the system’s states. Formulating that bound in terms of Jensen’s inequality requires that
4Dropping the dependency on m for clarity.
5<. >q means the expectation under the density q.6In statistical physics, an ‘ensemble’ denotes a fictitious collection of replicas of the system in question, each of which represents a
possible state that the real system might be in.
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function to be a probability density, which links the system’s states to the hidden causes of its
sensory input. In other words, the system is compelled to represent the causes of its sensorium.
This means adaptive systems, at some level, represent the state and causal architecture of the
environment in which they are immersed. Conversely, this means that causal regularities in
the environment are transcribed into the system’s configuration.
Note that the free-energy is defined by two densities; the ensemble density q(ϑ;λ) and the
generative density, , from which one could generate sensory samples and their causes.
The generative density factorises into a likelihood and prior density, , which
specify a generative model. This means the free-energy formulation induces a generative model
for any system and an ensemble density over the causes or parameters of that model. The
functional form of these densities is needed to evaluate the free-energy. We will consider
functional forms that may be employed by the brain in the next section. At the moment, we
will just note that these forms enable the free-energy to be defined as a function,  of
the system’s sensory input and internal state. Figure 2 shows a schematic of the quantities
introduced so far; and how they relate to each other.
The free-energy principle
The free-energy principle states that all the quantities that can change; i.e., that are part of the
system, will change to minimise free-energy. These quantities are the internal parameters λ
and the action parameters, α. This principle, as we will see below, is sufficient to account for
adaptive exchange with the environment by ensuring a bound on adaptive value is optimised.
We now consider the implications of minimising the free-energy with respect to λ and α
respectively.
Perception: Optimising λ—Clearly, if action is to minimise surprise, the free-energy bound
should be reasonably tight. A tight bound is assured when the free-energy is minimised with
respect to internal parameters. In this case, it is fairly easy to show that the ensemble density
approximates the conditional density of the environmental causes, given the sensory samples.
This can be seen by rearranging Eq.3 to show the dependence of the free-energy on λ.
4
Only the second term is a function of λ ; this is a Kullback-Leibler cross-entropy or divergence
that measures the difference between the ensemble density and the conditional density of the
causes. Because this measure is always positive, minimising the free-energy corresponds to
making the ensemble density the same as the conditional density; at which point the free-energy
becomes the surprise; . This is quite a fundamental result that underlies
free-energy optimisation schemes in statistical physics and machine learning and rests on the
fact that the divergence cannot be less than zero (in the sense that a distance cannot be negative).
This means that if one has minimised the free energy, one has implicitly minimised surprise,
because the second term in Eq.4 will be zero.
Put simply, when the free-energy minimised, the ensemble density encoded by the system’s
parameters becomes an approximation to the posterior probability of the causes of its sensory
input. This means the system implicitly infers the causes of its sensory samples. Clearly, this
approximation depends upon the physical structure of the system and the implicit form of the
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ensemble density; and how closely this matches the causal structure of the environment. Those
systems that can match their internal structure to the causal structure of the environment will
attain a tighter bound (see below).
Action: Optimising α—Changing the system to move or re-sample the environment by
minimising the free-energy with respect to action enforces a sampling of the environment that
is consistent with the ensemble density. This can be seen with a second rearrangement of Eq.
3 that shows how the free-energy depends upon α.
5
In this instance, only the first term is a function of action. Minimising this term corresponds
to maximising the log-probability of sensory input, expected under the ensemble density. In
other words, the system will sample sensory inputs that are the most likely under the ensemble
density. However, as we have just seen, the ensemble density approximates the conditional
distribution of the causes given sensory inputs. This inherent circularity obliges the system to
fulfil its own expectations. In other words, the system will expose itself selectively to causes
in the environment that it expects to encounter. However, these expectations are limited to the
repertoire of physical states the system can occupy, which specify the ensemble density.
Therefore, systems with a low free-energy can only sample parts of the environment they can
encode with their repertoire of physical states. Because the free-energy is low, the inferred
causes approximate the real causes. This means the system’s physical state must be (in general)
sustainable under these causes, because each system is its own existence proof (where a system
can be any unit of section; i.e., a phenotype or a species). In short, low free-energy systems
will look like they are responding adaptively to changes in the external or internal milieu, to
maintain a homeostatic exchange with the environment.
This paper is concerned largely with perceptual inference and learning in neural systems.
However, there are many intriguing issues that arise when we consider that the free-energy
principle is served by sampling from the environment selectively to maximise the predictability
of sensory input. This sort of behaviour is found in many biological systems, ranging from the
chemotactic movement of single-cell organisms to the phototropic behaviour of plants. In
nervous systems there are numerous examples of sensory homeostasis, ranging from simple
reflexes that reverse proprioceptive perturbations, to smooth pursuit eye movements
responsible for stabilisation of the retinal image. Heuristically, these mechanisms can be
viewed as suppressing free-energy by re-sampling the environment to minimise the prediction
error incurred by a mismatch between what is sampled and the prediction afforded by
perceptual inference. This suggests that motor and sensory systems in the brain should be in
intimate anatomic relation. This is the case at spinal, subcortical and cortical levels. For
example, the primary motor and sensory cortex are juxtaposed along the central sulcus and are
strongly interconnected (Huffmann & Krubitzer 2001). Similarly, at a subcortical level, the
superior collicullus represents a point of convergence for sensory information (through direct
projections from the retina) and visual predictions (from visual, parietal and frontal cortex to
the intermediate and deep layers). Neuronal discharges in the deep layers, that initiate saccades,
define motor-fields that coincide with visual receptive fields in the superficial layers (Andersen
et al 1989).
In summary, the free-energy principle can be motivated, quite simply, by noting that systems
that minimise their free-energy respond to environmental changes adaptively. It follows that
minimisation of free-energy may be a necessary, if not sufficient, characteristic of evolutionary
successful systems. The attributes that ensure biological systems minimise their free-energy
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can be ascribed to selective pressure, operating at somatic (i.e., the life time of the organism)
or evolutionary timescales (Edelman, 1993). These attributes include the functional form of
the densities entailed by the system’s architecture. Systems which fail to minimise free-energy
will have sub-optimal representations or ineffective mechanisms for action and perception.
These systems will not restrict themselves to specific domains of their milieu and may
ultimately experience a phase-transition (e.g., death). Note that in this formulation, adaptive
action depends on perception; perception per se is only necessary to ensure a tight bound on
the value-function minimised by action. Before returning to selective mechanisms, we will
unpack the quantities describing the system and relate their dynamics to processes in
neuroscience.
The mean-field approximation—Clearly, the quantities describing hidden causes in the
environment could be enormous in number and variety. A key difference among them is the
timescales over which they change. We will use this distinction to partition causes into three
sets ϑ=ϑu,ϑy,ϑθ that change on a timescale of milliseconds, seconds and minutes, and
factorise the ensemble density in terms of marginal densities
6
This induces a partitioning of the system’s parameters into λ = λu,λγ,λθ that encode time-varying
marginals of the ensemble density. The first, λu, are system quantities that change rapidly.
These could correspond to neuronal activity or electromagnetic states of the brain that change
with a timescale of milliseconds. The causes ϑu they encode correspond to evolving
environmental states, for example, changes in the environment caused by structural instabilities
or other organisms. The second partition λγ changes more slowly, over seconds. These could
correspond to the kinetics of molecular signalling in neurons; for example calcium-dependent
mechanisms underlying short-term changes in synaptic efficacy and classical neuromodulatory
effects. The equivalent partition of causes in the environment may be contextual in nature, such
as the level of radiant illumination or slowly varying fields that set the context for more rapid
fluctuations in its state. Finally, λθ represent system quantities that change slowly; for example
long-term changes in synaptic connections during experience-dependent plasticity, or the
deployment of axons that change on a neurodevelopmental timescale. The corresponding
environmental quantities are (relatively) invariant aspects of its causal architecture. These
could correspond to physical laws and other structural regularities that shape our interactions
with the world.
In statistical physics, the factorization in Eq.6 is known as a mean-field approximation.7
Clearly, our approximation with these marginal densities is a little arbitrary, but it helps
organise the functional correlates of their respective optimisation in the nervous system. More
precisely, we are assuming that the brain uses the same mean-field approximation used above
because it has evolved to exploit the ensuing computational efficiency; the mean-field
approximation greatly finesses the minimisation of free-energy when considering particular
mechanisms. These schemes usually employ variational techniques8.
7The basic idea of a mean-field approximation is to approximate a very high dimensional probability distribution with the product of a
number of simpler (marginal) densities. This is often used to cope with problems that are otherwise computationally or analytically
intractable.
8Variational techniques were introduced by Feynman (1972), in the context of quantum mechanics, using the path integral formulation.
They have been adopted widely by the machine learning community (e.g., Hinton and von Camp, 1993; MacKay, 1995). Established
statistical methods like expectation maximisation and restricted maximum likelihood (Dempster et al, 1977, Harville 1977) can be
formulated in terms of free-energy (Neal and Hinton, 1998, Friston et al 2006).
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Optimising variational modes
We now revisit optimisation of system parameters that underlie perception in more detail, using
the mean-field approximation. Because variational techniques predominate in this
approximation, the free-energy in Eq.3 is also known as the variational free-energy and λi are
called variational parameters. The mean-field factorisation means that the approximation
cannot cover the effect of random fluctuations in one partition, on the fluctuations in another.
However, this is not a severe limitation because these effects are modelled through mean-field
effects (i.e., through the means of random fluctuations). This approximation is particularly easy
to motivate in the present framework, because random fluctuations at fast timescales are
unlikely to have a direct effect at slower timescales and their influence can be sensibly
approximated with their average.
Using variational calculus it is simple to show (see Appendix 1) that, under the mean-field
approximation above, the marginal ensemble densities have the following form
7
where I(ϑi) is simply the log-probability of the input and its causes ϑi, expected under the
ensemble density of the other partitions, q\i. We will call this the variational energy. From Eq.
7 it is evident that the mode (highest point) of the ensemble density maximises the variational
energy. The mode is an important variational parameter. For example, if we assume q(ϑi) is
Gaussian, then it is parameterised by two variational parameters λi = μi,Σi encoding the mode
or expectation and covariance respectively. This is known as the Laplace approximation and
will be used later. In what follows, we will focus on minimising the free-energy by optimizing
μi; noting that there may be other variational parameters describing higher moments.
Fortunately, under the Laplace approximation, the only other variational parameter required
is the covariance. This has a simple form, which is an analytic function of the mode and does
not need to be represented explicitly (see Friston et al 2006 and Appendix 2). We now look at
the optimisation of the variational modes μi and the neurobiological and cognitive processes
this optimisation entails:
Perceptual inference: Optimising μu—Minimising the free-energy with respect to
neuronal states μu means maximising I(ϑu)
8
The free-energy principle is served when the variational mode of the states (i.e., neuronal
activity) changes to maximize the posterior probability of the causes. Eq.8 shows that this can
be achieved, without knowing the true posterior, by maximising the expected log-likelihood
and prior that specify a probabilistic generative model (second line). As mentioned above, this
optimisation requires the functional form of the generative model. In the next section, we will
look at hierarchical forms that are commensurate with the structure of the brain. For now, it is
sufficient to note that the free-energy principle means that brain states will come to encode the
most likely causes in the environment generating sensory input.
Generalised coordinates—Because states are time-varying quantities, it is important to
think about what their ensemble density encodes. This includes not just the states at one moment
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in time but their high-order motion. In other words, a particular state of the environment and
its probabilistic encoding can embody dynamics by representing the paths or trajectories of
states in generalised coordinates. Generalised coordinates are a common device in physics and
normally cover position and momentum.9 In the present context, a generalised state includes
the current state, and its generalised motion ϑu=u,u′,u′′, (i.e., the state and its first, second,
etc. derivatives with time), with corresponding variational modes . It is fairly simple
to show (Friston, 2007) that the optimisation in Eq.8 can be achieved with a rapid gradient
descent, while coupling high to low-order motion via mean-field terms
9
Here μ&u mean the rate of change of μu and κ is some suitable rate constant. The simulations
in the next section use this descent scheme, which can be implemented using relatively simple
neural networks. Note, when the conditional mode has found the maximum of I(ϑu), its
gradient is zero and the motion of the mode becomes the mode of the motion; i.e., .
However, it is perfectly possible, in generalised coordinates, for these quantities to differ. At
the level of perception, psychophysical phenomena suggest that we use generalised
coordinates, at least perceptually: for example, on stopping, after looking at scenery from a
moving train, the world is perceived as moving but does not change its position. The impression
that visual objects change their position in accord with their motion is something that we have
learned about the world. It is also something that can be unlearned, temporarily (e.g., perceptual
after-effects). We now turn to how these causal regularities are learned.
Perceptual context and attention: Optimising μγ—If we call the causes that change
on an intermediate timescale, ϑy contextual, then optimizing μγ corresponds to encoding the
probabilistic contingencies in which the fast dynamics of states evolve. This optimization can
proceed as above; however, we can assume that the context changes sufficiently slowly that
we can make the approximation, . Because, these variational parameters change more
slowly than the neuronal states, the free-energy may change substantially. This means the
variational parameters optimise the sum of free-energy over time10. This gives the simple
gradient ascent
10
We will see later that the conditional mode μγ encoding context might correspond to the strength
of lateral interactions among neurons in the brain. These lateral interactions control the relative
effects of top-down and bottom-up influences on perceptual inference. This suggests that
attention could be thought of in terms of optimizing contextual parameters of this sort. It is
important to note that, in Eq.10, the dynamics of μγ are determined by the expectation under
9Generalised coordinates include any non-standard (non-Cartesian) coordinate system applied to the analysis of a physical system. For
example, a system of m particles in three dimensions may have up to 3m degrees of freedom, and therefore 3m generalised coordinates
(one for each dimension of motion of each particle). A system of m rigid bodies in three dimensions may have up to 6m generalised
coordinates (three axes of rotation and three axes of translation for each body).
10In the simulations below, we use peristimulus time. The integral of energy over time is known as action, which means that, strictly
speaking, it is variational action that is optimised (see below).
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the ensemble density of the perceptual states. This means that it is possible for the system to
adjust its internal representation of probabilistic contingencies in a way that is sensitive to the
states and their history. A simple example of this, in psychology, would be the Posner paradigm,
where a perceptual state, namely an orienting cue, directs visual attention to a particular part
of visual space in which a target cue will be presented. In terms of the current formulation, this
would correspond to a state-dependent change in the variational parameters encoding context
that bias perceptual inference towards a cued part of the sensorium.
The key point here is that the mean-field approximation allows for inferences about rapidly
changing perceptual states and more slowly changing context to influence each other through
mean-field effects (i.e.,. the expectations in Eq.8 and Eq.10). This can proceed without
representing the joint distribution in an ensemble density over state and context explicitly
(c.f., Rao 2005). Another important interaction between variational parameters relates to the
encoding of uncertainty. Under the Laplace assumption, this is encoded by the conditional
covariances. Critically the conditional covariance of one ensemble is a function of the
conditional mode of the others (see Eq.A5 in Appendix 2). In the present context, the influence
of context on perceptual inference can be cast in terms of encoding uncertainty. We will look
at neuronal implementations of this in the next section.
Perceptual learning: Optimising μθ—Optimizing the variational mode encoding ϑy
corresponds to inferring and learning structural regularities in the environment’s causal
architecture. As above, this learning can be implemented as a gradient ascent on the time
integral of I(ϑy), which represents an expectation under the ensemble density encoding the
generalised states and context.
11
In the brain, this descent can be formulated as changes in connections that are a function of
pre-synaptic prediction and post-synaptic prediction error (see Friston 2003; 2005 and the next
section). The ensuing learning rule conforms to simple associative plasticity or, in dynamic
models, spike-timing-dependent plasticity. In the sense that optimizing the variational
parameters that correspond to connection strengths in the brain encodes causal structure in the
environment, this instance of free-energy minimisation corresponds to learning. The implicit
change in the brain’s connectivity endows it with a memory of past interactions with the
environment that affects the free-energy dynamics underlying perception and attention. This
is through the mean-field effects in Eq.8 and Eq.10. Put simply, sustained exposure to
environmental inputs causes the internal structure of the brain to recapitulate the causal
structure of those inputs. In turn, this enables efficient perceptual inference. This formulation
provides a transparent account of perceptual learning and categorization, which enables the
system to remember associations and contingencies among causal states and context.
Variational action and free-energy
The integrals over time, in Eq.10 and Eq.11, speak to a more general principle that entails the
minimisation of action (c.f., Hamilton’s principle of stationary action). Action is the time-
integral of energy
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Strictly speaking, all variational parameters optimise action, which is a bound on the integral
of the surprise or free-energy. For time-varying variational parameters, the principle of
stationary action requires the variation δqi A of action with respect to q(ϑi,t) to be zero. The
Fundamental Lemma of variational calculus states that 11
13
This means that the variation of the free-energy with respect to q(ϑi,t) should be zero at all
times. This is simply the free-energy principle (see Appendix 1). In brief, we only need to
invoke variational action if some of the marginal ensemble densities do not change with time;
otherwise the free-energy principle is sufficient. The variational action can also be regarded
as a bound on the path-integral of adaptive value as the system’s interaction with the
environment evolves (i.e., summarises the value of sensory interactions harvested over a period
of time). In what follows, one can think about variational action as a generalisation of the
marginal likelihood, to cover dynamic models.
Model optimisation
Hitherto, we have considered only the quantitative optimisation of variational parameters given
a particular system and its implicit generative model. Exactly the same free-energy (or
stationary action) principle can be applied to optimise the model itself. Different models can
come from populations of systems or from qualitative changes in one system over time. A
model here corresponds to a particular architecture that can be enumerated with the same set
of variational parameters. Removing a part of the system or adding, for example, a synaptic
connection, changes the model and the variational parameters in a qualitative or categorical
fashion.
Model optimisation involves maximising the marginal likelihood (or variational action) of the
model itself. In statistics and machine learning this is equivalent to Bayesian model selection,
where the free-energy is used to approximate the log evidence or marginal likelihood,
 for a particular model, mi. This approximation can be motivated easily using
Eq.4: If the system has minimised its free-energy and the divergence term is near zero, then
the free-energy approaches the negative log-evidence. Therefore, modes that maintain a low
free-energy (i.e., a low variational action) are likely to have a high marginal likelihood.
An evolutionary perspective might consider the variational action  in terms
of adaptive fitness, which is defined for any system’s exchange with the environment and is
independent of its internal state, λ. An adaptive system will keep this exchange within bounds
that ensure its physical integrity. Systems that fail to suppress free-energy will encounter
surprising interactions with the environment that may remove them from the population. Notice
that the ensuing hierarchical selection rests upon interplay between optimising the parameters
11Here, and later we write ∂tA as a short form for the partial derivative ∂A/∂t ; similarly, δqA denotes the variation of A with respect to
q(t).
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of each model and optimising an ensemble of models. Optimisation at both levels is prescribed
by the free-energy principle. In the theory of genetic algorithms, similar schemes are referred
to as hierarchical co-evolution (e.g., Maniadakis and Trahanias, 2006). A similar relationship
is found in Bayesian inference, where model selection is based on the free-energy
approximation to the model evidence that is furnished by optimising the parameters of each
model. In short, free-energy may be a useful surrogate for adaptive fitness in an evolutionary
setting and the log-evidence in model selection.
In short, within an organism’s lifetime its parameters minimise free-energy, given the model
implicit in its phenotype. At a supraordinate level, the models themselves may be selected,
enabling the population to explore model space and find optimal models. This exploration
depends upon the heritability of key model components, which could be viewed as priors about
environmental niches the system can model.
Summary—The above arguments suggest biological systems sample their environment to
fulfil expectations that are generated by the model implicit in their structure. The free-energy
principle explains adaptive behaviour without invoking notions of reinforcement or operant
conditioning: From the point of view of the agent, it is simply sampling the environment so
that its sensory input conforms to its expectations. From its perspective, the environment is an
accommodating place; fluctuations or displacements caused by environmental forces are
quickly explained away by adaptive re-sampling. Because action is not encoded by the
ensemble density, these adaptive responses may not be perceived. However, for someone
observing this system, it will appear to respond adaptively to environmental changes and avoid
adverse conditions. In other words, it will seem as if certain stimulus-response links are
selectively reinforced to ensure the homeostasis of its internal milieu, where this reinforcement
emerges spontaneously in the larger context of action and perception under the free-energy
principle.
The assertion that adaptive systems should minimise unlikely or surprising exchanges with the
environment may seem implausible at first glance. For example, one of the most likely things
to happen is death; and minimizing an organism’s avoidance of death doesn’t seem very
adaptive. The key thing to note here is that surprise is conditioned on the organism; it is the
surprise, given the system’s expectations embodied in its phenotype or current state. Clearly,
if a phenotype expects to die and it conforms to a free-energy principle, it will die. The argument
is that when natural selection operates on a population, such phenotypes will disappear, leaving
those that expect to live (there may be exceptions to this, if death entails progeny; other
interesting exceptions are phase-transitions in developmental trajectories; e.g., in metamorphic
insects).
It might be thought that the relationship between value and surprise is ambiguous; in the sense
that some valuable events are surprising, whereas value is the converse of surprise. Again, this
is resolved by noting that surprise is conditional on the agent. Although, wining a lottery may
be improbable it is not surprising, in the sense you expected to win on entering; imagine you
won a lottery that you had not entered: you would immediately think there had been a mistake
(which would be unexpected and of little value). In short, surprise is distinct from improbability
because is depends on expectations under the model of the environment used to evaluate
probability (i.e., ln p (y) ≠ ln p(y|m) ). In this sense, it is conceptually (if not mathematically)
the same as ‘Bayesian surprise’, invoked to explain visual search and the deployment of
attention (Itti and Baldi 2006). The definition of Bayesian surprise rests on the divergence
between the prior and conditional densities elaborated during perceptual inference. This again
emphasises the role of prior expectations in shaping surprise or value. The distinction between
conditional surprise and improbability suggests that, a priori we expect to be (for example)
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rich, are chronically surprised that we are not but value monetary gains that transiently render
our expectations valid.
A further counterintuitive aspect of minimising surprise is that it seems to preclude exploratory
behaviour, novelty-seeking and risk-taking. However, this is not the case. Optimisation of free-
energy may engage different mechanisms at different time-scales. Below, we will focus on
dynamics and gradient descent that may be used in the brain. However, at an ethological level
different schemes may operate; for example, stochastic explorations of the free-energy function
(c.f., genetic algorithms). This would entail sampling the environment is a stochastic fashion
to find samples with the least surprise. From an observers point of view this would appear like
random or exploratory behaviour. From the agent’s point of view, everything is surprising, so
it might as well sample desperately until something familiar is encountered. The trade-off
between exploration and exploitation is a central theme in evolutionary theory, learning theory,
microeconomics and optimization theory (e.g. March 1991) and can be applied easily to free-
energy functions.
In this section, we have developed a free-energy principle for the evolution of an organism’s
state and structure and have touched upon minimisation of free-energy at the population level,
through hierarchical selection. Minimising free-energy corresponds to optimising the
organism’s configuration, which parameterises an ensemble density on the causes of sensory
input and optimising the model itself in somatic or evolutionary time. Factorization of the
ensemble density to cover quantities that change on different timescales provides an ontology
that maps nicely onto perceptual inference, attention and learning. In the next section, we
consider how the brain might instantiate the free-energy principle with a special focus on the
likelihood models implied by its structure.
GENERATIVE MODELS IN THE BRAIN
In this section, we will look at how the rather abstract principles of the previous section might
be applied to the brain. We have already introduced the idea that a biological structure encodes
a model of its environment. We now look at the form of these models implied by the structure
of the brain and try to understand how evoked responses and associative plasticity emerge
naturally with minimisation of free-energy. In the current formulation, attributes or quantities
describing the brain parameterise an ensemble density of environmental causes. To evaluate
the free-energy of this density we need to specify the functional form of the ensemble and
generative densities. We will assume a Gaussian form for the ensemble densities (i.e., the
Laplace approximation), which is parameterised by its mode or expectation and covariance.
The generative density is specified by its likelihood and priors. Together these constitute a
generative model. If this model is specified properly, we should be able to predict, using the
free-energy principle, how the brain behaves in different contexts. In a series of previous papers
(e.g., Friston and Price, 2001; Friston 2003; 2005) we have described the form of hierarchical
generative models that might be employed by the brain. In this section, we will cover briefly
the main points again.
Perception and sensation
This section is about trying to understand cortical responses in terms of perceptual inference
and learning. The specific model considered here rests on empirical Bayes, using generative
models that are embodied in cortical hierarchies. This model can be regarded as a mathematical
formulation of the longstanding notion (Locke 1690) that “our minds should often change the
idea of its sensation into that of its judgement, and make one serve only to excite the other”.
In a similar vein, Helmholtz (1860) distinguished between perception and sensation. “It may
often be rather hard to say how much from perceptions as derived from the sense of sight is
due directly to sensation, and how much of them, on the other hand, is due to experience and
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training” (see Pollen 1999). In short, there is a distinction between percepts, which are the
products of recognising the causes of sensory input, and sensation per se. Recognition, i.e.,
inferring causes from sensation, is the inverse of generating sensory data from their causes. It
follows that recognition rests on models, learned through experience, of how sensations are
caused. In this section, we will consider hierarchical generative models and how cortical
responses can be understood as part of the recognition process. The particular recognition
scheme we will focus on is empirical Bayes, where prior expectations are abstracted from the
sensory input, using a hierarchical model of how those data were caused.
Conceptually, empirical Bayes and generative models are related to ‘analysis-by-
synthesis’ (Neisser 1967). This approach to perception, from cognitive psychology, involves
adapting an internal model of the world to match sensory input and was suggested by Mumford
(1992) as a way of understanding hierarchical neuronal processing. The idea is reminiscent of
Mackay’s epistemological automata (MacKay 1956) which perceive by comparing expected
and actual sensory input (Rao 1999). These models emphasise the role of backward connections
in mediating predictions of lower level input, based on the activity of higher cortical levels.
Recognition is simply the process of solving an inverse problem, by jointly minimising
prediction error (i.e., free energy) at all levels of the cortical hierarchy. This perspective
explains many physiological and behavioural phenomena, e.g. extra-classical receptive field
effects and repetition suppression in unit recordings, the mismatch negativity (MMN) and P300
in event-related potentials (ERPs), priming and global precedence effects in psychophysics.
Critically, many of these emerge from the same basic principles governing inference with
hierarchical generative models.
To finesse the inverse problem, posed by non-invertible generative models, constraints or priors
are required. These resolve the ill-posed problems that confound recognition based on purely
forward architectures. It has long been assumed that sensory units adapt to the statistical
properties of the signals to which they are exposed (see Simoncelli and Olshausen 2001 for
review). The Bayesian framework for perceptual inference has its origins in Helmholtz’s notion
of perception as unconscious inference. Helmholtz realised that retinal images are ambiguous
and that prior knowledge was required to account for perception (Kersten et al 2004). Kersten
et al (2004) provide an excellent review of object perception as Bayesian inference and ask a
fundamental question “Where do the priors come from? Without direct input, how does image-
independent knowledge of the world get put into the visual system?” In the next subsection we
answer this question and show how empirical Bayes allows most of the necessary priors to be
learned and induced online, during inference.
Hierarchical dynamic models in the brain
A key architectural principle of the brain is its hierarchical organisation (Zeki and Shipp,
1988; Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Mesulam, 1998; Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002). This
organisation has been studied most thoroughly in the visual system, where cortical areas can
be regarded as forming a hierarchy; with lower areas being closer to primary sensory input and
higher areas adopting a multimodal or associational role. The notion of a hierarchy rests upon
the distinction between forward and backward connections (Rockland and Pandya, 1979;
Murphy and Sillito, 1987; Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Sherman and Guillery, 1998;
Angelucci et al, 2002a). The distinction between forward and backward connections is based
on the specificity of cortical layers that are the predominant sources and origins of extrinsic
connections in the brain. Forward connections arise largely in superficial pyramidal cells, in
supra-granular layers and terminate in spiny stellate cells of layer four or the granular layer of
a higher cortical area (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; DeFelipe et al 2002). Conversely,
backward connections arise largely from deep pyramidal cells in infra-granular layers and
target cells in the infra and supra granular layers of lower cortical areas. Intrinsic connections
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are both intra and inter-laminar and mediate lateral interactions between neurons that are a few
millimetres away. Due to convergence and divergence of extrinsic forward and backward
connections, receptive fields in higher areas are generally larger than in lower areas (Zeki and
Shipp, 1988). There is a key functional distinction between forward and backward connections
that renders backward connections more modulatory or non-linear in their effects on neuronal
responses (e.g., Sherman and Guillery, 1998). This is consistent with the deployment of voltage
sensitive and non-linear NMDA receptors in the supra-granular layers (Rosier et al. 1993) that
are targeted by backward connections. Typically, the synaptic dynamics of backward
connections have slower time constants. This has led to the notion that forward connections
are driving and illicit an obligatory response in higher levels, whereas backward connections
have both driving and modulatory effects and operate over greater spatial and temporal scales.
The hierarchical structure of the brain speaks to hierarchical models of sensory input. For
example
14
In this model sensory states, y are caused by a non-linear function of internal states, g
(x(1),v(1)) plus a random effect z(1). The dynamic states x(1) have memory and evolve according
to equations of motion prescribed by the non-linear function f(x(1),v(1)). These dynamics are
subject to random fluctuations w(1) and perturbations from higher levels that are generated in
exactly the same way. In other words, the input to any level is the output of the level above.
This means causal states v(i) link hierarchical levels and dynamic states x(i) are intrinsic to each
level, linking states over time. The random fluctuations can be assumed to be Gaussian, with
a covariance encoded by some hyper-parameters  ,and independent across levels. The
functions at each level are parameterised by . This form of hierarchical dynamical model is
very generic and subsumes most models found in statistics and machine learning as special
cases. These cases depend on the choice of the functions and assumptions about the form of
the priors. For example, static models discount dynamic states x(i) and retain only the functions
g(v(2)) (e.g., g(v(i)) = θ(i)v(i) for mixed effects models used in analysis of variance), where
assumptions about the covariance of v(i) correspond to empirical priors on the causes.
This model specifies the functional form of the generative density in generalised coordinates
of motion (see Appendix 3) and induces an ensemble density on the generalised states
. If we assume neuronal activity is the variational mode  of these states
and the variational mode of the model parameters  and  corresponds to synaptic efficacy
or connection strengths, we can write down the variational energy as a function of these modes
using Eq.8; with 
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Here  is a generalised prediction error for the states at the i-th level. The generalised
predictions of the causal states and motion of the dynamic states are  and  respectively
(see Appendix 3). Here,  represents the generalised velocity of .
 are the precisions of the random fluctuations that control their amplitude and
smoothness. For simplicity, we have omitted terms that depend on the conditional covariance
of the parameters; this is the same approximation used by expectation maximisation (Dempster
et al, 1977).
The dynamics and architecture of perceptual inference—As mentioned above, we
will focus on the optimization of the ensemble density covering the states, implicit in perception
or perceptual inference. From Eq.8 we obtain an expression that describes the dynamics of
neuronal activity under the free-energy principle.
16
These dynamics describe how neuronal states self-organise when the brain is exposed to
sensory input. The form of Eq.16 is quite revealing; it is principally a function of prediction
error, namely the mismatch between the expected state of the world, at any level, and that
predicted on the basis of the expected state in the level above. Critically, inference only requires
the prediction error from the lower level  and the higher level . This drives conditional
expectations  to provide a better prediction, conveyed by backward connections, to explain
the prediction error away. This is the essence of the recurrent dynamics that self-organise to
suppress free-energy or prediction error; i.e., recognition dynamics; .
Critically, the motion of the expected states is a linear function of the bottom-up prediction
error. This is exactly what is observed physiologically, in the sense that bottom-up driving
inputs elicit obligatory responses in higher levels that do not depend on other bottom-up inputs.
In fact, the forward connections in Eq.16 have a simple form12
12⊗ is the Kronecker tensor product, and I denotes the identity matrix.
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This comprises block diagonal repeats of the derivatives gx = ∂g/∂x (similarly for the other
derivatives). D is a block matrix with identity matrices in its first diagonal that ensure the
internal consistency of generalised motion. The connections are modulated by the precisions
encoded by . The lateral interactions within each level have an even simpler form
18
and reduce to the precisions of the causes at that level. We will look at the biological substrate
of these interactions below.
The form of Eq.16 allows us to ascribe the source of prediction error to superficial pyramidal
cells, which means we can posit these as encoding prediction error. This is because the only
quantity that is passed forward from one level in the hierarchy to the next is prediction error
and superficial pyramidal cells are the major source of forward influences in the brain
(Felleman & Van Essen 1991;Mumford 1992). Attributing this role to superficial pyramidal
cells is useful because these cells are primarily responsible for the genesis of
electroencephalographic (EEG) signals that can be measured non-invasively. The prediction
error itself is formed by predictions conveyed by backward connections and dynamics intrinsic
to the level in question. These influences embody the non-linearities implicit in  and ;
see Eq.17. Again, this is entirely consistent with the non-linear or modulatory role of backward
connections that, in this context, model interactions among inferred states to predict lower level
inferences. See Figure 3 for a schematic of the implicit neuronal architecture.
In short, the dynamics of the conditional modes are driven by three things. The first links
generalised coordinates to ensure the motion of the mode approximates the mode of the motion.
This ensures the representation of causal dynamics is internally consistent. The second is a
bottom-up effect that depends upon prediction error from the level below. This can be thought
of as a likelihood term. The third term, corresponding to an empirical prior, is mediated by
prediction error at the current level. This is constructed using top-down predictions. An
important aspect of hierarchical models is that they can construct their own empirical priors.
In the statistics literature these models are known as parametric empirical Bayes models (Efron
and Morris, 1973) and rely on the conditional independence of random fluctuation at each level
(Kass and Steffey 1989).
In summary, the dynamics of perceptual inference at any level in the brain are moderated by
top-down priors from the level above. This is recapitulated at all levels, enabling self-
organisation through recurrent interactions to minimise free-energy by suppressing prediction
error throughout the hierarchy. In this way, higher levels provide guidance to lower levels and
ensure an internal consistency of the inferred causes of sensory input at multiple levels of
description.
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Perceptual attention and learning
The dynamics above describe the optimization of conditional or variational modes describing
the most likely cause of sensory inputs. This is perceptual inference and corresponds to
Bayesian inversion of the hierarchical generative model described in Eq.14. In this simplified
scheme, in which conditional covariances have been ignored, minimising the free-energy is
equivalent to suppressing hierarchical prediction error. Exactly the same treatment can be
applied to changes in extrinsic and intrinsic connectivity encoding the conditional modes μγ
and μθ.
As above, the changes in these modes or synaptic efficacies are relatively simple functions of
prediction error and lead to forms that are recognisable as associative plasticity. Examples of
these derivations, for static systems are provided in Friston (2005). The contextual variables
are interesting because of their role in moderating perceptual inference. Eq.16 shows that the
influence of prediction error from the level below and the current level is scaled by the
precisions  and  that are functions of μγ. This means that the relative influence
of the bottom-up likelihood term and top-down prior is controlled by modulatory influences
encoded by μγ. This selective modulation of afferents is exactly the same as gain-control
mechanisms that have been invoked for attention (e.g., Treue and Maunsell, 1996; Martinez-
Trujillo and Treue, 2004). It is fairly simple to formulate neuronal architectures in which this
gain is controlled by lateral interactions that are intrinsic to each cortical level (see Figure 3).
As noted in the previous section changes in μγ are supposed to occur at a timescale that is
intermediate between the fast dynamics of the states and slow associative changes in extrinsic
connections mediating the likelihood model. One could think of μγ as describing the short-term
changes in synaptic efficacy, in lateral or intrinsic connections that depend upon classical
neuromodulatory inputs and other slower synaptic dynamics (e.g., after-hyperpolarisation
potentials, slow changes in synchronized oscillations and molecular signalling). The
physiological aspects of these intermediate dynamics provide an interesting substrate for
attentional mechanisms in the brain (see Schroeder et al, 2001 for review) and are not unrelated
to the ideas in Yu and Dayan (2005). These authors posit a role for acetylcholine (an ascending
modulatory neurotransmitter) mediating expected uncertainty. Neural modulatory
neurotransmitters have, characteristically, much slower time constants, in terms of their
synaptic effects, than glutamatergic neurotransmission that is employed by forward and
backward extrinsic connections.
The Bayesian brain
The similarity between the form or structure of the brain and statistical models means that
perceptual inference and learning lends itself nicely to a hierarchical treatment, which considers
the brain as an empirical Bayesian device. The dynamics of neurons or populations are driven
to minimise error at all levels of the cortical hierarchy and implicitly render themselves
posterior or conditional modes (i.e. most likely values) of the causes given sensory inputs. In
contradistinction to supervised learning, hierarchical prediction does not require any desired
output. Unlike many information theoretic approaches they do not assume independent causes.
In contrast to regularised inverse solutions (e.g. in machine vision) they do not depend on a
priori constraints. These emerge spontaneously as empirical priors from higher levels.
The scheme implicit in Eq.16 sits comfortably with the hypothesis (Mumford, 1992) “on the
role of the reciprocal, topographic pathways between two cortical areas, one often a ‘higher’
area dealing with more abstract information about the world, the other ‘lower’, dealing with
more concrete data. The higher area attempts to fit its abstractions to the data it receives from
lower areas by sending back to them from its deep pyramidal cells a template reconstruction
best fitting the lower level view. The lower area attempts to reconcile the reconstruction of its
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view that it receives from higher areas with what it knows, sending back from its superficial
pyramidal cells the features in its data which are not predicted by the higher area. The whole
calculation is done with all areas working simultaneously, but with order imposed by
synchronous activity in the various top-down, bottom-up loops”. We have tried to show that
this sort of hierarchical prediction can be implemented in brain-like architectures using
mechanisms that are biologically plausible. Furthermore, this sort of scheme arises from some
basic principles concerning adaptive systems and free-energy.
Backward or feedback connections?—There is something slightly counterintuitive
about generative models in the brain. In this view, cortical hierarchies are trying to generate
sensory predictions from high-level causes. This means the causal structure of the world is
embodied in the backward connections. Forward connections simply provide feedback by
conveying prediction error to higher levels. In short, forward connections are the feedback
connections. This is why we have been careful not to ascribe a functional label like ‘feedback’
to backward connections. Perceptual inference emerges from mutually informed top-down and
bottom-up processes that enable sensation to constrain perception. This self-organising process
is distributed throughout the hierarchy. Similar perspectives have emerged in cognitive
neuroscience on the basis of psychophysical findings. For example, Reverse Hierarchy
Theory distinguishes between early explicit perception and implicit low-level vision, where
“our initial conscious percept - vision at a glance - matches a high-level, generalised, categorical
scene interpretation, identifying “forest before trees” (Hochstein and Ahissar (2002).
Schemes based on generative models can be regarded as arising from the distinction between
forward and inverse models adopted in machine vision (Ballard 1983; Kawato et al 1993).
Forward models generate inputs from causes (c.f. generative models); whereas inverse models
approximate the reverse transformation of inputs to causes (c.f. recognition models). This
distinction embraces the non-invertability of generating processes and the ill-posed nature of
inverse problems. As with all underdetermined inverse problems the role of constraints is
central. In the inverse literature a priori constraints usually enter in terms of regularised
solutions. For example: “Descriptions of physical properties of visible surfaces, such as their
distance and the presence of edges, must be recovered from the primary image data.
Computational vision aims to understand how such descriptions can be obtained from
inherently ambiguous and noisy data” (Poggio et al 1985). The architectures that emerge from
these schemes suggest that “Feedforward connections from the lower visual cortical area to
the higher visual cortical area provide an approximated inverse model of the imaging process
(optics)”. Conversely, “ the back-projection from the higher area to the lower area provides a
forward model of the optics” (Kawato et al 1993). See also Harth et al (1987). This perspective
highlights the importance of backward connections and the role of empirical priors during
Bayesian inversion of generative models.
Summary—In conclusion, we have seen how a fairly generic hierarchical and dynamical
model of environmental inputs can be transcribed onto neuronal quantities to specify the free-
energy and its minimisation. This minimisation corresponds, under some simplifying
assumptions, to a suppression of prediction error at all levels in a cortical hierarchy. This
suppression rests upon a balance between bottom-up (likelihood) influences and top-down
(prior) influences that are balanced by representations of uncertainty. In turn, these
representations may be mediated by classical neural modulatory effects or slow post-synaptic
cellular processes that are driven by overall levels of prediction error. Overall, this enables
Bayesian inversion of a hierarchical model of sensory input that is context-sensitive and
conforms to the free-energy principle. We will next illustrate the sorts of dynamics and
behaviours one might expect to see in the brain, using a simple simulation.
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Simulations
Generative and recognition models—Here, we describe a very simple simulation of a
two-layer neuronal hierarchy to show the key features of its self-organised dynamics, when
presented with a stimulus. The system is shown in Figure 4. On the left is the system used to
generate sensory input and on the right is the neuronal architecture used to invert this
generation; i.e., to recognise or disclose the underlying cause. The generative system used a
single input (a Gaussian bump function) that excites a damped oscillatory transient in two
reciprocally connected dynamic units. The output of these units is then passed through a linear
mapping to four sensory channels. Note that the form of the neuronal or recognition model
recapitulates the generative model: The only difference is that the causal states are driven by
prediction errors which invoke the need for forward connections (depicted in red). The inferred
causes, with conditional uncertainty (shown as 95% confidence intervals) concur reasonably
with the real causes. The input pattern is shown as a function of time and in image format at
the top of the figure. This can be thought of as either a changing visual stimulus, impinging on
four photo-receptor channels or, perhaps, a formant over time-frequency in an acoustic setting.
This simulation can be regarded as reproducing sensory evoked transients and corresponds to
Bayesian inversion of the generative model shown on the left hand side of the figure. In this
context, because we used a dynamical generative model, the inversion corresponds to a
deconvolution. If we allow the connection strengths in the recognition model to minimise free-
energy, we are also implicitly estimating the parameters of the corresponding generative model.
In machine learning and signal-processing this is known as blind deconvolution. Examples of
this are shown in Figure 5. Here, we presented the same stimulus eight times and recorded the
prediction error in the input or lowest level, summed over all peristimulus time. The initial
values of the parameters were the same as in the generative model (those used in Figure 4).
The upper panels show the stimulus and predicted input, in image format, for the first and last
trial. It can be seen that both the first and eighth predictions are almost identical to the real
input. This is because the connection strengths, i.e., conditional modes of the parameters (in
the recognition model), started with the same values used by the generative model. Despite
this, optimising the parameters enables the recognition model to encode this stimulus more
efficiently, with a progressive suppression of prediction error with repeated exposure. This
effect is much more marked if we use a stimulus that the recognition model has not seen before.
We produced this stimulus by adding small random numbers to the parameters of the generative
model. At the first presentation, the recognition model tries to perceive the input in terms of
what it already knows and has experienced (c.f., an illusion); in this case, a prolonged version
of the expected stimulus. This produces a large prediction error. By the eighth presentation,
changes in the parameters enable it to recognise and predict the input almost exactly, with a
profound suppression of prediction error with each repetition of the input.
Repetition suppression—This simple simulation shows a ubiquitous and generic aspect
of free-energy minimisation schemes and indeed real brain responses; namely repetition
suppression. This phenomenon describes the reduction or suppression in evoked responses on
repeated presentation of stimuli. This can be seen in many contexts, ranging from the mismatch
negativity in EEG research (Näätänen, 2003) to fMRI examples of face processing (see Henson
et al, 2000 and Figure 6). In the next section we look more closely at this and related
phenomena.
SUPPRESSING FREE-ENERGY IN THE BRAIN
There are clearly a vast number of predictions and experiments that follow from the free-energy
treatment of the previous sections. We have reviewed many of these elsewhere (e.g., Friston
and Price, 2001; Friston, 2003; 2005). In this section, we review briefly some aspects of
functional brain anatomy that relate to the theoretical treatment above. From the previous
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section, we can suggest that activity in a cortical hierarchy self-organises to minimise its free-
energy through minimising prediction error. Is this sufficient to account for classical receptive
fields and functional segregation seen in cortical hierarchies, such as the visual system?
Classical receptive fields
The answer is yes. We have shown previously that minimising free-energy is equivalent to
maximising the mutual information between sensory inputs and neuronal activity encoding
their underlying causes (Friston 2003). There have been many compelling developments in
theoretical neurobiology that have used information theory (e.g. Barlow 1961, Optican and
Richmond 1987, Linsker 1990, Oja 1989, Foldiak 1990). Many appeal to the principle of
maximum information transfer (e.g. Linsker 1990, Atick and Redlich 1990, Bell and Sejnowski
1995). This principle has proven extremely powerful in predicting many of the basic receptive
field properties of cells involved in early visual processing (e.g. Atick and Redlich 1990,
Olshausen and Field 1996). This principle represents a formal statement of the common sense
notion that neuronal dynamics in sensory systems should reflect, efficiently, what is going on
in the environment (Barlow 1961).
Extra-classical receptive fields
Classical models (e.g. classical receptive fields) assume that evoked responses will be
expressed invariably in the same units or neuronal populations, irrespective of context.
However, real neuronal responses are not invariant but depend upon the context in which they
are evoked. For example, visual cortical neurons have dynamic receptive fields that can change
from moment to moment. A useful synthesis that highlights the anatomical substrates of
context-dependent responses can be found in Angelucci et al (2002b). The key conclusion is
that “feedback from extrastriate cortex (possibly together with overlap or inter-digitation of
coactive lateral connectional fields within V1) can provide a large and stimulus-specific
surround modulatory field. The stimulus specificity of the interactions between the centre and
surround fields may be due to the orderly matching structure and different scales of intra-areal
and feedback projection excitatory pathways.”
Extra-classical effects are commonplace and are generally understood in terms of the
modulation of receptive field properties by backward and lateral afferents. There is clear
evidence that horizontal connections in visual cortex are modulatory in nature (Hirsch and
Gilbert 1991), speaking to an interaction between the functional segregation implicit in the
columnar architecture of V1 and activity in remote populations. These observations suggest
that lateral and backwards interactions may convey contextual information that shapes the
responses of any neuron to its inputs (e.g. Phillips and Singer 1997) to confer the ability to
make conditional inferences about sensory input.
The most detailed and compelling analysis of extra-classical effects, in the context of
hierarchical models and predictive coding, is presented in Rao and Ballard (1999). These
authors exposed a hierarchical network to natural images. The neurons developed simple-cell-
like receptive fields. In addition, a subpopulation of error units showed a variety of extra-
classical receptive field effects suggesting that “non-classical surround effects in the visual
cortex may also result from cortico-cortical feedback as a consequence of the visual system
using an efficient hierarchical strategy for encoding natural images.” One non-classical feature
the authors focus on is end-stopping. Visual neurons that respond optimally to line segments
of a particular length are abundant in supragranular layers and have the curious property of
end-stopping or end-inhibition; vigorous responses to optimally oriented line segments are
attenuated or eliminated when the line extends beyond the classical receptive field. The
explanation for this effect is simple: because the hierarchy was trained on natural images,
containing long line segments, the input caused by short segments could not be predicted and
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error responses could not be suppressed. This example makes a fundamental point: the selective
response of these units does not mean they have learned to encode short line segments. Their
responses reflect the fact that short line segments have not been encountered before and
represent an unexpected visual input, given the context established by input beyond the
classical receptive field. In short, their response signals a violation of statistical regularities
that have been learned.
If these models are right, interruption of backward connections should disinhibit the response
of supragranular error units that are normally suppressed by extra-classical stimuli. Rao and
Ballard (1999) cite inactivation studies, of high-level visual cortex in anaesthetised monkeys,
in which disinhibition of responses to surround stimuli is observed in lower areas (Hupe et
al 1998). Furthermore, removal of feedback from V1 and V2 to the lateral geniculate nucleus
(LGN) reduces the end-stopping of LGN cells (Murphy and Sillito 1987).
Long-latency evoked responses
In addition to explaining the form of classical receptive fields the temporal form of evoked
transients is consistent with empirical (hierarchical) Bayes. This is summarised nicely by Lee
and Mumford (2003); “Recent electrophysiological recordings from early visual neurons in
awake behaving monkeys reveal that there are many levels of complexity in the information
processing of the early visual cortex, as seen in the long latency responses of its neurons. These
new findings suggest that activity in the early visual cortex is tightly coupled and highly
interactive with the rest of the visual system.” Long-latency responses are used to motivate
hierarchical Bayesian inference in which “the recurrent feedforward/feedback loops in the
cortex serve to integrate top-down contextual priors and bottom-up observations so as to
implement concurrent probabilistic inference.”
The prevalence of long-latency responses in unit recordings is mirrored in similar late
components of event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded non-invasively. The cortical hierarchy
in Figure 3 comprises a chain of coupled oscillators. The response of these systems, to sensory
perturbation, usually conforms to a damped oscillation, emulating a succession of late
components. Functionally, the activity of error units at any one level reflect states that have
yet to be explained by higher-level representations and will wax and wane as higher-level
causes are selected and refined. The ensuing transient provides a compelling model for the
form of ERPs, which look very much like damped oscillation in the alpha range. In some
instances specific components of ERPs can be identified with specific causes. For example the
N170, a negative wave about 170ms after stimulus onset, is elicited by face stimuli, relative to
non-face stimuli. In what follows, we focus on a few examples of late components. The
emerging theme is that late components reflect inference about supraordinate or global causes
at higher levels in the hierarchy.
Examples from neurophysiology—This example considers evidence for hierarchical
processing in terms of single-cell responses, to visual stimuli, in the temporal cortex of
behaving monkeys. If perceptual inference rests on a hierarchical generative model, then
predictions that depend on the high-order attributes of a stimulus must be conferred by top-
down influences. Consequently, one might expect to see the emergence of selectivity, for high-
level attributes, after the initial visual response (although delays vary greatly, it typically takes
about ten milliseconds for spikes to propagate from one cortical area to another). The late
emergence of selectivity is seen in motion processing. A critical aspect of visual processing is
the integration of local motion signals generated by moving objects. This process is
complicated by the fact that local velocity measurements can differ depending on contour
orientation and spatial position. Specifically, any local motion detector can measure only the
component of motion perpendicular to a contour that extends beyond its field of view (Pack
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and Born 2001). This aperture problem is particularly relevant to direction-selective neurons
early in the visual pathways, where small receptive fields permit only a limited view of a
moving object. Pack and Born (2001) have shown “that neurons in the middle temporal visual
area (known as MT or V5) of the macaque brain reveal a dynamic solution to the aperture
problem. MT neurons initially respond primarily to the component of motion perpendicular to
a contour’s orientation, but over a period of approximately 60 ms the responses gradually shift
to encode the true stimulus direction, regardless of orientation”. It is interesting to note that
extra-classical receptive field effects in supragranular V1 units are often manifest 80-100
milliseconds after stimulus onset, “suggesting that feedback from higher areas may be involved
in mediating these effects” (Rao and Ballard 1999).
Examples from electrophysiology—In the discussion of extra-classical receptive field
effects above we established that evoked responses, expressed 100ms or so after stimulus onset,
could be understood in terms of a failure to suppress prediction error when the local information
in the classical receptive field was incongruent with the global context, established by the
surround. Exactly the same phenomena can be observed in ERPs evoked by the processing of
compound stimuli that have local and global attributes (e.g. an ensemble of L shaped stimuli,
arranged to form an H). For example, Han and He (2003) have shown that incongruence
between global and local letters enlarged the posterior N2, a component of visually evoked
responses occurring about 200ms after stimulus onset. This sort of result may be the
electrophysiological correlate of the global precedence effect expressed behaviourally. The
global precedence effect refers to a speeded behavioural response to a global attribute relative
to local attributes and the slowing of local responses by incongruent global information (Han
and He 2003).
Examples from neuroimaging—Although neuroimaging has a poor temporal resolution,
the notion that V1 responses, evoked by compound stimuli, can be suppressed by congruent
global information can be tested easily. Murray et al (2002) used functional MRI to measure
responses in V1 and a higher object processing area, the lateral occipital complex, to visual
elements that were either grouped into objects or arranged randomly. They “observed
significant activity increases in the lateral occipital complex and concurrent reductions of
activity in primary visual cortex when elements formed coherent shapes, suggesting that
activity in early visual areas is reduced as a result of grouping processes performed in higher
areas. These findings are consistent with predictive coding models of vision that postulate that
inferences of high-level areas are subtracted from incoming sensory information in lower areas
through cortical feedback.”
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the characteristics of biological systems, in relation to non-
adaptive self-organizing and dissipative systems. Biological systems act on the environment
and sample it selectively to avoid phase-transitions that will irreversibly alter their structure.
This adaptive exchange can be formalised in terms of free-energy minimisation, in which both
the behaviour of the organism and its internal configuration minimise its free-energy. This free-
energy is a function of the ensemble density encoded by the organism’s configuration and the
sensory data to which it is exposed. Minimisation of free-energy occurs through action-
dependent changes in sensory input and the ensemble density implied by internal changes.
Systems that fail to maintain a low free-energy will encounter surprising environmental
conditions, in which the probability of finding them (i.e., surviving) is low. It may therefore
be necessary, if not sufficient, for biological systems to minimise their free-energy.
The variational free-energy is not a thermodynamic free-energy but a free-energy formulated
in terms of information theoretic quantities. The free-energy principle discussed here is not a
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consequence of thermodynamics but arises from population dynamics and selection. Put
simply, systems with a low free-energy will be selected over systems with a higher free-energy.
The free-energy rests on a specification of a generative model, entailed by the organism’s
structure. Identifying this model enables one to predict how a system will change if it conforms
to the free-energy principle. For the brain, a plausible model is a hierarchical dynamic system
in which neural activity encodes the conditional modes of environmental states and its
connectivity encodes the causal context in which these states evolve. Bayesian inversion of
this model, to infer the causes of sensory input, is a natural consequence of minimising free-
energy or, under simplifying assumptions, the suppression of prediction error.
The ideas presented in this paper have a long history, starting with the notions of neuronal
energy described by Helmholtz (1860) and covering ideas like analysis by synthesis (Neisser,
1967) and more recent formulations like Bayesian inversion and predictive coding (e.g.,
Ballard et al, 1983; Mumford, 1992; Dayan et al, 1995; Rao & Ballard, 1998). The specific
contribution of this paper is to provide a general formulation of the free-energy principle to
cover both action and perception. Furthermore, this formulation can be used to connect
constructs from machine learning and statistical physics with ideas from evolutionary theory
theoretical neurobiology biology and microeconomics.
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Appendix 1
Free-form variational density
This appendix derives the functional form of the ensemble density.
Lemma: The free-energy is maximised with respect to qi=q(ϑi) when
A.1
where Zi is a normalisation constant (i.e., partition function). We will call I(ϑi) the variational
energy, noting its expectation under qi is the negative expected energy. q\i=q(ϑ\i), where ϑ\i
denotes parameters not in the i-th set.
Proof: The Fundamental Lemma of variational calculus states that F is maximised with respect
to qi when, and only when
A.2
δqiF is the variation of the free-energy with respect to qi. From Eq.1
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A.3
We have lumped terms that do not depend on ϑi into ln Zi. The extremal condition is met when
∂qifi = 0, giving Eq.A.1.
Appendix 2
The conditional covariances
Under the Laplace approximation, the variational density assumes a Gaussian form qi = N
(μi,Σi) with variational parameters μi and Σi, corresponding to the conditional mode and
covariance of the i-th parameter set. The advantage of this approximation is that the conditional
covariance can be evaluated very simply: Under the Laplace approximation the free-energy is
A.4
pi is the number of parameters in the i-th set. The conditional covariances obtain as an analytic
function of the modes by differentiating the free-energy and solving for zero
A.5
This solution for the conditional covariances does not depend on the mean-field approximation
but only on the Laplace approximation. See Friston et al (2006) for more details.
Appendix 3
Dynamic models
Here we consider the functional form of the generative density for hierarchical dynamic models
of the sort described in the main text. To simplify things, we will deal with a single level and
generalise to multiple levels later.
A.6
The continuous nonlinear functions f(x,v) and g(x,v) of states are parameterised by ϑθ.
Stochastic fluctuations z(t) are assumed to be analytic such that the covariance of
 is well defined in generalised coordinates; similarly for random fluctuations in the
states, . Under local linearity assumptions, the generalised motion  is
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A.7
This induces a variational density q(ϑu,t) on generalised causes  that are necessary to
generate . Here,  and  are predictions of the generalised response
 and velocity of the dynamic states , in the absence of random fluctuations.
The equations on the right prescribe dynamics by coupling low and high-order motion of .
The likelihood and priors
Gaussian assumptions about the fluctuations furnish the functional form of the likelihood,
, where Π(ϑy)v is the precision (i.e., inverse covariance) of  that controls
its amplitude and smoothness. The priors are
A.8
Gaussian assumptions about fluctuations in the dynamic states induce empirical priors on their
generalised velocity, , where Π(ϑy)x is the precision of . These impose
dynamic constraints and confer memory on the states. We assume Gaussian priors on the
parameters and hyperparameters13 and flat priors on the remaining states.
We now have now the functional form of the likelihood and priors of the generative model.
This enables us to specify the variational energies that the modes have to optimise; from A.1
A.9
13Noting that nonlinearities in Π(ϑy)u and the functions in Eq.A.6 allow for any arbitrary transform to non-Gaussian priors.
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Where  is the generalised velocity of . So far we have assumed the priors  are flat.
However, we can impose a priori structure on these states using hierarchical models:
Hierarchical models
The hierarchical generalization of Eq.A.1, with y = v(0) is
A.10
This induces empirical priors on the states and lends the generative density a Markov form
(Kass and Steffey, 1989), through independence assumptions about the random fluctuations
in different levels14.
A.11
The prediction  plays the role of a prior expectation on  and its prior
precision is estimated empirically as ; hence empirical Bayes (Efron and Morris,
1973). In short, a hierarchical form endows a model with the ability to construct its own priors.
This feature is central to many inference and estimation procedures ranging from mixed-effects
analyses in classical covariance component analysis to automatic relevance determination. See
Friston et al (2006) for a fuller discussion of static models.
In hierarchical models, the variational energies are (omitting constants)
A.12
14We have omitted conditional dependence on the parameters and hyperparameters for clarity.
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The gradients of these quantise specify the dynamics of the variational parameters as described
in the main text. Note that we have omitted terms pertaining to conditional uncertainty from
the expressions for the states and parameters. This is the same approximation used in
expectation maximisation and simplifies neuronal implementation considerably. In fact, Uγ =
0 when  is linear in the hyperparameters, because ∂2L(μ)/∂ϑy∂ϑy=0 (see Eq.A.4).
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Figure 1.
Schematic highlighting the difference between dissipative, self-organising systems (like
normal snowflakes) and adaptive systems (like adaptive snowflakes) that can change their
relationship to the environment. By occupying a particular environmental niche, biological
systems can restrict themselves to a domain that is far from phase-boundaries. The phase-
boundary depicted here is a temperature phase-boundary that would cause the snowflake to
melt (i.e., induce a phase-transition). In this fanciful example, we have assumed that snowflakes
have been given the ability to fly and maintain their altitude (and temperature) and avoid being
turned into raindrops.
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Figure 2.
Schematic detailing the quantities that define the free-energy. These quantities refer to the
internal configuration of the brain and quantities that determine how a system is influenced by
the environment. This influence is encoded by the variables  that could correspond to sensory
input or any other changes in the system state due to external environmental forces or fields.
The parameters α correspond to physical states of the system that change the way the external
forces act upon it or, more simply, change the way the environment is sampled. A simple
example of these would be the state of ocular motor systems controlling the direction of eye
gaze.  is the conditional probability of sensory input given its causes, ϑ7, and the
state of effectors (i.e., action). q(ϑ;λ) is called an ensemble density and is encoded by the
system’s parameters, λ. These parameters (e.g., mean or expectation) change to minimise free-
energy, F and, in so doing, make the ensemble density an approximate conditional density on
the causes of sensory input.
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Figure 3.
Schematic detailing the neuronal architectures that encode an ensemble density on the states
and parameters of hierarchical models. The upper panel shows the deployment of neurons
within three cortical areas (or macro-columns). Within each area the cells are shown in relation
to the laminar structure of the cortex that includes supra-granular (SG) granular (L4) and infra-
granular (IG) layers The lower panel shows an enlargement of a particular area and the
speculative cells of origin of forward driving connections that convey prediction error from a
lower area to a higher area and the backward connections that carry predictions. These
predictions try to explain away input from lower areas by suppressing the mismatch or
prediction error. In this scheme, the source of forward connections is the superficial pyramidal
cell population and the source of backward connections is the deep pyramidal cell population.
The differential equations relate to the free-energy minimisation scheme detailed in the main
text.
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Figure 4.
Diagram showing the generative model (left) and corresponding recognition; i.e., neuronal
model (right) used in the simulations. Left panel: this is the generative model using a single
cause v(1), two dynamic states  and four outputs y1,K, y4. The lines denote the
dependencies of the variables on each other, summarised by the equation on top (in this example
both the equations were simple linear mappings). This is effectively a linear convolution model,
mapping one cause to four outputs, which form the inputs to the recognition model (solid
arrow). The architecture of the corresponding recognition model is shown on the right. This
has a corresponding architecture, but here the prediction error units, , provide feedback. The
combination of forward (red lines) and backward influences (black lines) enables recurrent
dynamics that self-organise (according to the recognition equation;  to
suppress and hopefully eliminate prediction error, at which point the inferred causes and real
causes should correspond.
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Figure 5.
Results of repeated presentations to the simulated neural network shown in the previous figure.
Left panels: the four channel sensory data used to evoke responses and the predictions from
these evoked responses for the first and last of eight trials are shown on top, in image format.
The corresponding prediction error (summed over the entire trial period after rectification) is
shown below. As expected, there is a progressive reduction in prediction error as the system
learns the most efficient causal architecture underlying the generation of sensory inputs. Right
panels: exactly the same as above but now using an unpredictable or unfamiliar stimulus that
was created using a slightly different generative model. Here, learning the causal architecture
of this new stimulus occurs progressively over repeated presentations, leading to profound
reduction in prediction error and repetition suppression.
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Figure 6.
A summary of the results of an fMRI experiment reported in Henson et al (2000). The upper
panel shows responses to visually presented faces for the first presentation (blue) and the second
presentation (red). This is a nice example of repetition suppression as measured using fMRI.
The inserts show voxels that were significantly activated by all faces (red) and those that
showed significant repetition suppression in the fusiform cortex (blue).
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